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Peace and Conflict Studies
The Legal Implications Arising from Economic and Social Reconstruction
as an Aspect of Peace Support Operations
Claire Breen

Abstract
This article asserts that the link between peace and security and stabilization and
development, as exemplified by the UN-mandated international presences in Afghanistan,
is to be welcomed but that, from the perspective of the laws governing both the use of
force and the conduct of warfare, such an evolution is problematic for a number of
reasons. One, the broader functions of the military in peace support raises questions for
jus ad bellum such as determining whether the basis for the peace enforcement has been
achieved, as States and their armed forces engage in stabilization and state-building
initiatives as a means to counter breaches of and threats to the peace. Two, the broader
functions are problematic for jus in bello as the practical application of such initiatives is
not easily incorporated into a body of law that was drafted primarily to deal with interstate conflict and only provides limited guidance on internal conflict such as that in
Afghanistan. Consequently, international law must evolve to clarify the rights and
obligations stemming from peace support operations for both States and their military
personnel.
Introduction
Despite the legal controversy surrounding the US-led military invasion of
Afghanistan in October 2001, Security Council resolutions passed in December of that
year formed the legal basis for an international military presence in Afghanistan.
Volume 18, Number 2

192

Peace and Conflict Studies
Subsequently, this presence was expanded to include a Security Council mandate to
rebuild Afghanistan. There are two strands to this mandate: a military strand, primarily
in the form of the NATO-led International Stabilization Force (ISAF); and a civilian
strand, embodied in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
The basis for both mandates, according to the Security Council, is to restore and maintain
international peace and security and to assist Afghanistan to transition from a state of
conflict to a state of peace. In this regard, the Council‘s response may be regarded as
peace support, comprising stabilization and state-building operations. There are two
questions arising from this situation. One, if peace support is an expression of modern
collective security measures, is peace support indicative of an evolving international law
governing use of force (jus ad bellum)? Two, does peace support impact upon the body of
international law governing the conduct of warfare (jus in bello) as States and their armed
forces engage in stabilization and state-building initiatives? Perhaps the central question
is what, if any, legal obligations arise out of peace support missions?
This article attempts to answer these questions, in light of New Zealand‘s peace
support role in Afghanistan, through its deployment of Defence Force Personnel as a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Bamyan Province. Although there are many
aspects to peace support (not least use of force issues), this article will focus on economic
and social (re)development given that such measures are a recognized, but often
overlooked, aspect of maintaining international peace and security. Economic and social
development would also appear to be an increasing aspect of the responsibilities of the
military, in spite of the fact that it would appear, on first glance, to be a role more
appropriately assigned to the non-military.

Volume 18, Number 2

193

Peace and Conflict Studies
This article will first consider Security Council resolutions, which form the legal
basis of ISAF and UNAMA with particular focus on reconstruction activities as an aspect
of international peace and security. It will then consider the international agreements
regarding the reconstruction of Afghanistan, with particular focus upon their economic
and social development aspects. It will consider the significance of such developments
for maintaining peace and security which in turn is suggestive of a more expansive
meaning of the maintenance of international peace and security. The article will focus
on the work of PRTs which are more regularly engaged in functions that hitherto may
have been regarded as being the functions of their non-military counterparts operating
under the umbrella of UNAMA. It will focus on the activities of the New Zealand PRT
(NZ PRT) in this regard. Finally, the article will consider the relationship between peace
support activities and international humanitarian law (IHL). It will demonstrate that the
current laws governing use of force and the conduct of warfare are rather ill-suited to the
ever-expanding and increasingly complex environment in which peace support operations
operate.
The article concludes that the link between peace and security and stabilization
and development is to be welcomed but that such an evolution is problematic for a
number of reasons. One, the broader functions of the military in peace support raise
questions for jus ad bellum such as determining whether the basis for the deployment of
the peace enforcement operation has been achieved, as States and their armed forces
engage in stabilization and state-building initiatives as a means to counter breaches of
and threats to the peace. Two, the broader functions are problematic for jus in bello as
the practical application of such initiatives is not easily incorporated into a body of law
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that was drafted primarily to deal with inter-state conflict and only provides limited
guidance on internal conflict such as that in Afghanistan.
ISAF and UNAMA: Security Council Responses to Threats
to International Peace and Security
In 2001, in paragraph 4 of resolution 1378, the Security Council called on
Member States to provide long-term assistance for the social and economic
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The outcome of this resolution was the
establishment of an international presence in Afghanistan primarily comprising ISAF,
which is a NATO-led security and development mission, and UNAMA, which as its title
indicates, is a UN mission designed to assist Afghanistan to transition from conflict to
peace. Both presences were established by Security Council resolutions and their
mandates were elaborated upon by the Agreement On Provisional Arrangements in
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,
S/2001/1154 (the Bonn Agreement). International intervention in Afghanistan was
intervention into a State where human and natural forces had combined to destroy almost
all social, physical, and economic infrastructure, leaving it without adequate roads,
electricity, schools and hospitals (Bosi 2003). The international community recognized
that the restoration, and maintenance, of peace and security in Afghanistan was no longer
a case of ―
bashing and whacking‖ but involved a long-term, financially well supported,
and, quite literally, hands-on approach to rebuilding the State. The response by the
international community has been one of initial stabilization, followed by further
stabilization efforts aimed at effecting a longer-term peace. Both the short-term and
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long-term efforts recognize and incorporate economic and social development as a core
strategy.
ISAF: Pacification and Stabilization Roles
ISAF‘s mandate was established by the Bonn Agreement, Annex 1, to create a
secure environment in and around Kabul and so that the Afghan Interim Authority and
UN personnel could operate in a safe environment which would support the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. ISAF‘s focus upon counter-insurgency (pacification) and
state-building (stabilization) across Afghanistan reflected the peace enforcement mandate
granted to it under Chapter VII of the Charter on the determination by the Security
Council, in 2001, that the situation in Afghanistan continued to pose a threat to
international peace and security. ISAF member states are authorized to take all necessary
measures to fulfill the mandate (UNSC res 1386). The mission involves troops from 48
nations who operate under robust rules of engagement, as well as a myriad of
international aid agencies and private charities, private security contractors, engineers,
development experts, political advisors and education specialists (NATO February 2011;
Hynes, Newton Lyons and Weber 2007).
ISAF‘s mandate was extended annually by resolutions 1413 and 1444
respectively. In 2003, the mandate was expanded, by resolution 1510, to assist the
Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan
outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan authorities, as well as UN personnel
and other international civilian personnel engaged in activities including reconstruction
and humanitarian efforts, could operate in a secure environment, and to provide security
assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.
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Resolutions 1563 and 1623 provided for an expansion of ISAF‘s mandate in response to
the Council‘s recognition of the constraints upon the full implementation of the Bonn
Agreement resulting from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan.
The Security Council‘s response to the situation in Afghanistan has continued to evolve.
In resolution 1707, for example, the Council recognized once again the interconnected
nature of the challenges in Afghanistan. In reaffirming that sustainable progress on
security, governance and development, as well as on the cross-cutting issue of counternarcotics, was mutually reinforcing it welcomed the continuing efforts of the Afghan
Government and the international community to address these challenges. In renewing
ISAF‘s mandate in October 2010 the Council stressed yet again the central role that the
UN continued to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. It noted in the
context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of
ISAF and it stressed the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual
support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities. As in previous
resolutions, the Council reiterated its concern at the security situation and the harmful
consequences of violent and terrorist activities on the capacity of the Afghan Government
to guarantee the rule of law, to provide basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure
the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms (UNSC res 1943).
As this brief overview indicates, the core function of ISAF is to establish a secure
environment, using all necessary force. In effecting its mandate, ISAF has assisted the
Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, thereby creating the conditions for
the fulfillment of the other aspect of its mandate, which is reconstruction, development
and effective governance as per the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact, the
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Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the London and Kabul
Communiqués and decisions made by the Government of Afghanistan. The manner in
which ISAF fulfils this aspect of its mandate is considered in more detail below.
UNAMA: Recovery, Reconstruction and Development
In establishing UNAMA, by resolution 1401 of March 2002, the Security Council
reaffirmed both its previous resolutions on Afghanistan in particular resolutions 1378,
1383, 1386 and recalled all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular
resolution 56/220. The Council also stressed, inter alia, that the provision of focused
recovery and reconstruction assistance could greatly assist in the implementation of the
Bonn Agreement. According to the Secretary-General, ―Re
covery and reconstruction
efforts cannot wait the successful conclusion of the peace process, but rather their early
and effective delivery are central to the success of the process itself‖ (A/56/875S/2002/278, para. 98(h)). The emphasis on recovery and reconstruction is evident in the
resolutions that have extended UNAMA‘s mandate on an annual basis ever since. In
resolution 1419, the Council called upon all Member States to provide long-term
assistance and on-going budget support for the social and economic reconstruction and
rehabilitation of Afghanistan as a whole. Prior to that, in resolution 1401, the Council
had encouraged donor countries that pledged financial aid at the Tokyo Conference on
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to fulfill their commitments as soon as possible.
When renewing UNAMA‘s mandate the following year, the Council noted, in the context
of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and ISAF, and
stressed the need for continued cooperation and coordination. The Council called upon
the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including
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ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition (OEF), in accordance with their
respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to
the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist
groups and criminal activities (UNSC res 1746).
The manner in which the Security Council has come to recognize the
interrelationship between international peace and security and economic and social
development, or in the case of Afghanistan, recovery, reconstruction and development,
can be seen more recently in its extension of UNAMA‘s mandate, in March 2011. In
resolution 1974, the Council stressed, once again, the importance of a comprehensive
approach to address the situation in Afghanistan and recognized that there was no purely
military solution to ensure the stability of Afghanistan. The Council continued its
recognition of the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan and reaffirmed
that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the crosscutting issue of counter-narcotics, was mutually reinforcing. The Council welcomed the
continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address
these challenges through a comprehensive approach. In resolution 1974, the Council also
noted, in this context, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and ISAF and stressed
the need for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support. The Council
further decided that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG), operating within their mandates and guided by the principle of reinforcing
Afghan ownership and leadership, would continue to lead the international civilian
efforts, in accordance with their priorities as laid out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1974, as
follows:
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(a) promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the
Afghan Government‘s development and governance priorities, including
through supporting the ongoing development of the new National Priority
Programs, mobilization of resources, coordination of international donors
and organizations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations
agencies, funds and programs, in particular for counter-narcotics,
reconstruction and development activities; at the same time, support
efforts to increase the proportion of development aid delivered through the
Afghan Government, and support efforts to increase the transparency and
effectiveness of the Afghan Government‘s use of such resources;
(b) strengthen the cooperation with ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian
Representative at all levels and throughout the country in support of the
transition to Afghan leadership agreed to at the Kabul and London
Conferences and the Lisbon Summit, in a sustainable manner to ensure the
protection and promotion of the rights of all Afghans, in accordance with
their existing mandates, in order to improve civil-military coordination, to
facilitate the timely exchange of information and, to ensure coherence
between the activities of national and international security forces and of
civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization
process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction
teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations, ….
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Arguably, UNAMA has a strong mandate as regards human rights and economic
and social development (Kreilkamp 2002/03), although this aspect of the mandate, like
the mandate overall, is limited to providing assistance to the transitional authority
(Schoiswohl 2006; A/56/875-S/2002/278). UNAMA exemplifies the manner in which
the Security Council has begun to move towards a much broader understanding of peace
and security that acknowledges the significance of human rights and economic and social
factors. UNAMA, both as a multidimensional peace operation in its own right as well as
being an operation intertwined with ISAF, advances the doctrinal shift, first advanced in
the Brahimi Report, of incorporating elements of peace-building into peace operations
(O‘Flaherty 2003). However, the actual impact of this doctrinal shift has been limited by
the fact that donors have been slow to deliver on the generous pledges made to the
planned recovery programs which has meant that much of its recovery programming has
had to be scaled back in the face of insufficient funds (Griffin 2003). ISAF and UNAMA
provide separate but entwined legal frameworks for the peace support mission in
Afghanistan. However, as the Security Council resolutions indicate, its peace support
initiatives are largely dependent on upon the fulfillment of international agreements
pertaining to Afghanistan.
Rebuilding Afghanistan: From Security Council Resolutions
to International Agreements
The above-mentioned resolutions are at the apex of the international efforts to
rebuild Afghanistan. In terms of international law, the resolutions are binding although,
perhaps unsurprisingly, the language of the resolutions is somewhat vague. The
Council‘s calls for recovery and reconstruction assistance are made in tandem with and,
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according to the Council, are heavily reliant upon the implementation of a number of
international agreements containing much of the detail underpinning reconstruction in
Afghanistan.
The Bonn Agreement: Transitioning towards Permanent Governance
The Bonn Agreement created the agenda and process for the establishment of
permanent governance institutions, representing a new level of commitment and political
will by both Afghans and major powers (Johnson 2006). The agreements paved the way
for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority,
UNAMA, and ISAF.
Amongst the wide range of issues covered by the Bonn Agreement was the
interrelationship between economic and social recovery and international peace and
security. In paragraph 2, the participants to the Agreement urged the UN, the
international community, particularly donor countries and multilateral institutions, to
reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation,
recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority.
For its part, the Security Council, in resolution 1471, stressed that the continued provision
of focused recovery and reconstruction assistance could contribute significantly to the
implementation of the Bonn Agreement and, to this end, urged bilateral and multilateral
donors to coordinate closely with the SRSG and the Afghan Transitional Administration,
in particular through the Afghan Consultative Group Process. It reiterated its strong
support for the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement. It also supported, in
resolution 1536, the objectives of the international conference which took place in Berlin
from 31 March to 1 April 2004 to allow the Afghan authorities and the international
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community to reaffirm their long-term commitment to take the transitional process in
Afghanistan forward, including by demonstrating support for the Afghan political process
and its national security, as well as by confirming and generating international financial
and other donations. In extending and supporting UNAMA‘s mandate, the Security
Council, in resolution 1589 for example, continued to affirm its support for the
implementation of the provisions of the Bonn Agreement and of the Berlin Declaration.
However, the Bonn Agreement is not a ―
peace agreement‖ between the parties to
the internal conflict in Afghanistan. Only the US-backed Northern Alliance was party to
the Agreement (Johnson 2006). As such, the Bonn Agreement is largely a political
agreement with little or no clear legal undertakings.
The Afghan Compact and the London and Kabul Communiqués: Sustaining
International Cooperation
The process outlined in the Bonn Agreement came to a formal end in 2005 with
the completion of the Parliamentary and Provincial elections. The Afghan Compact, the
culmination of the 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan, was a successor to the Bonn
process and established the framework for international cooperation with Afghanistan for
the ensuing five years. The Compact was agreed to by the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and the international community. Recognition of the interrelationship
between peace, security and economic and social development can be seen in some of the
Compact‘s preambular statements. According to the Compact, its parties expressed their:
[Determination] to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of
Afghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and global peace
and security;
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…
[Resolve] to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by setting
conditions for sustainable economic growth and development;
strengthening state institutions and civil society; removing remaining
terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding
capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty; and meeting basic human
needs;…
The Compact identified security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and
economic and social development as three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of
activity for the five years subsequent to its adoption. A further vital and cross-cutting area
of work was the elimination of the narcotics industry, which remained a formidable threat
to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond. Under the terms of the
Compact, the Afghan Government committed itself to realizing a shared vision of the
future and the international community, for its part, committed itself to provide resources
and support to realize that vision.
Annex I of the Compact set out detailed outcomes, benchmarks and timelines for
delivery, consistent with the high-level goals set by the ANDS. Annex I also identified a
number of goals in the area of economic and social development. The Afghan
Government with the support of the international community agreed to pursue high rates
of sustainable economic growth with the aim of reducing hunger, poverty and
unemployment. According to the Compact, public investments were to be structured
around the six sectors of the pillar on economic and social development of the ANDS
which are: infrastructure and natural resources; education; health; agriculture and rural
Volume 18, Number 2
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development; social protection; and economic governance and private sector
development. In each of these areas, the objective was to achieve measurable results
towards the goal of equitable economic growth that would reduce poverty, expand
employment and enterprise creation, enhance opportunities in the region and improve the
well-being of all Afghans. The Government and international community also committed
themselves to improving the effectiveness and accountability of international assistance
as set forth in Annex II. For its part, the Security Council‘s support for the
implementation of the Compact remained up until 2010 (UNSC res 1917), at which point
continued support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was reconstituted by both the
international community and the Council to reflect the outcomes of the London
Conference of January 2010. The ensuing Communiqué of the London Conference
continues the recognition by both the international community and Afghanistan of the
formidable development challenges faced by the latter which require sustained, long-term
support from the former (S/2010/65). According to the Communiqué:
Economic growth, respect for Rule of Law and human rights alongside
creation of employment opportunities, and good governance for all
Afghans are also critical to counter the appeal of the insurgency, as well as
being vital to greater stability in Afghanistan. (S/2010/65, para. 16)
The significance of economic and social development was reaffirmed in the
subsequent Kabul Communiqué which noted the support of the international community
for the Afghan Government‘s strategy of seeking to achieve fiscal independence through
an effective mix of investment in critical infrastructure and the development of a skilled
labor force and of a strong, value-adding agricultural sector. It was noted that part of the
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success of this strategy would depend upon initiatives such as public-private partnerships
in social and economic development, through adequate regulatory and institutional
reform.
The disparity between statements of intent and subsequent action on the part of
States and other donors raises an interesting question around the extent of States‘
international legal obligations in response to Security Council resolutions affirming the
Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact, the London and Kabul Communiqués, and UN
Charter obligations, more generally. Early Security Council resolutions pertaining to
Afghanistan indicate that the Bonn Agreement formed the core of the operation of the
mandate. However, the Agreement been described as neither a domestic agreement, an
international treaty, nor a peace-treaty. Consequently, whether the Agreement could
create rights and obligations for the United Nations given that the Agreement was merely
witnessed by the SRSG to Afghanistan has been questioned (Schoiswohl 2006; Report of
the Secretary-General 2002; Bonn Agreement 2001). Similarly, the theory of selfdetermination, posited to elevate the Agreement to the level of other international
agreements, has proven problematic as not all groups were adequately represented and, as
a result, a collective exercise of the right to self-determination could not be exercised
(Schoiswohl 2006).
Accordingly, it has been argued that that the Bonn Agreement does not qualify as
an enforceable international agreement so that those provisions that relate to the United
Nations should be only interpreted as a declaration concerning the latter's mandate in the
political reconstruction of Afghanistan. The affirmation of the Bonn Agreement by the
Security Council, in Resolution 1358, would have been unnecessary if the Bonn
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Agreement could be regarded as an international agreement between the United Nations
and ―
Afghanistan‖ represented by the participants to the Bonn talks (Schoiswohl 2006).
Similar analysis can be applied to the Afghan Compact and the subsequent
Communiqués. Following this view, the assistance provided by donors is not imposed, at
least technically, but provided on the basis of the normative framework of the type
originally enshrined in the Bonn Agreement. The converse of this analysis is the
obligation imposed by upon all Member States by Article 2(5) of the Charter to give the
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.
Overall, it would appear that the legally binding, although vaguely worded, Security
Council resolutions are dependent upon non-binding legal agreements pledging financial
support. This situation raises some questions around the ability of the Council to meet its
mandate which may have particular legal consequences for its initial and on-going armed
intervention, jus ad bellum, in Afghanistan more generally. This type of scenario raises
questions more generally regarding jus ad bellum and peace support operations if the goal
of the intervention is difficult or even impossible to determine, achieve or sustain.
Constructing Peace and Security: Stabilization and Development
Mandates and the Military
The peace support operation in Afghanistan is evidence of a more balanced
institutional approach aimed at simultaneously advancing recovery in governance,
security, justice and reconciliation, and socio-economic development (Rietjens, Bollen,
Khalil, and Fazlullah Wahidi 2009). It has resulted in a greater convergence between
military and non-military tasks so that military forces have been playing an increasing
role in the conduct of humanitarian and development missions, previously regarded as

Volume 18, Number 2

207

Peace and Conflict Studies
being the domain of civilian actors, because of the immediate needs of the situation
(Ryan 2007/08; MacNerney 2005/06; Freeman 2007). ISAF is conducting immediate
and longer-term stabilization operations either simultaneously with, or in rapid
succession to, security operations. Perhaps the most obvious aim of such stabilization
operations is the fulfillment of the Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. However,
such operations also aim to establish a secure environment in which local, domestic and
international actors, such as UNAMA, can operate.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: The Front Line in Securing Economic and Social
Reconstruction
ISAF established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), consisting of military
and civilian personnel, throughout Afghanistan to carry out stabilization and
reconstruction and development activities. Neither NATO nor ISAF have control over the
orientation and work of the PRTs. Each PRT reports to its own national authorities and
they tend to reflect the priorities of their troop contributing nations, which often leads to
coordination problems and inefficient development assistance (Kouvo 2009). According
to the UN Secretary-General, as the number of PRTs increases, as well as the number of
countries involved in them, issues of consistency and coordination with the Afghan
Government and the international community are increasingly relevant. Therefore,
special attention ought to be paid to ensuring that a unified vision and common policy are
implemented countrywide (A/58/742-S/2004/230; Tiersky 2009). PRTs assist ISAF‘s
overall goal of assisting the Afghan authorities to establish and strengthen those
institutions whose role it is to effect good governance, rule of law and the promotion of
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human rights. Development advisors are also embedded within the PRTs, Regional
Commands and ISAF Headquarters (NATO March 2010; NATO 2008; S/2003/1212).
In practical terms, PRTs provide area security and support for the reconstruction
and development efforts of local, national and international actors. On the one hand, the
PRTs‘ civilian components have responsibility for political, economic, humanitarian and
social matters. On the other hand, the PRTs‘ military components focus on increasing
security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity. The PRTs‘ military
components are also responsible for directing assistance to the civilian elements, in
particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance and engineering, thus
demonstrating the intertwined nature of military and civilian operators. Overall, various
kinds of projects are underway, facilitated by the NATO-ISAF PRTs. As the work of the
NZ PRT below indicates, schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of
ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation ditches, pipelines,
reservoirs and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and
farmers; infrastructure is being repaired and/or built to facilitate mobility and
communication; and local people are provided with greater access to medical assistance.
Upon request, ISAF PRTs are assisting the Afghan Government and international actors
with humanitarian relief. In particular, ISAF soldiers have launched several relief
missions, distributing medication, food and winter supplies to help villagers cope with
severe weather conditions in different parts of the country (NATO March 2010; Malley
2007; Bosi 2003).
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The NZ PRT: The Reality of Stabilization and Development
New Zealand Defence Force personnel began working in Afghanistan following
United Nations resolutions adopted after 11 September 2001. From the perspective of
domestic law, New Zealand‘s presence derives from s 5 of the Defence Force Act 1990
which provides:
The Governor-General may from time to time, in the name and on behalf
of the Sovereign, continue to raise and maintain armed forces, either in
New Zealand or elsewhere, for the following purposes:
(a) the defence of New Zealand, and of any area for the defence of which
New Zealand is responsible under any Act:
(b) the protection of the interests of New Zealand, whether in New
Zealand or elsewhere:
(c) the contribution of forces under collective security treaties,
agreements, or arrangements:
(d) the contribution of forces to, or for any of the purposes of, the United
Nations, or in association with other organisations or States and in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations:
(e) the provision of assistance to the civil power either in New Zealand or
elsewhere in time of emergency:
(f) the provision of any public service.
New Zealand has maintained a PRT in Bamyan Province since September
2003. Originally, the NZ PRT was originally part of New Zealand‘s contribution
to OEF. Since November 2006, the NZ PRT has operated under the command of
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ISAF. As with all deployments, the Chief of Defence Force maintains full
command of the NZ PRT. Operational command of deployed NZDF personnel is
the responsibility of the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand. New Zealand
also has personnel serving in ISAF headquarters and UNAMA.
The NZ PRT comprises four Liaison teams which facilitate aid efforts,
monitor disarmament and assist in the reconstruction of Afghan institutions,
including education facilities (NZDF October 2010). The provision of security
and stability to facilitate the deliverance of government assistance, capacity
building, and governance improvements has been a primary purpose. In 2009, the
head of New Zealand‘s PRT in Bamyan readily acknowledged that security was
only part of the mission:
We are heavily focused on development and more recently governance.
The NZPRT is in the middle of a $US40m ‗development surge‘ with the
priorities on roads, health and education infrastructure. This money is
being supplied by the US military, with meaningful contributions from
NZAID, USAID and Singapore. Significantly, the delivery is all Kiwi led
... Winning the people over is what will win this war; this means
improving the lives of Afghans.‖ (NZDF October 2009, 6).
In terms of assisting with governance, the NZ PRT has established relationships
with the Afghan regional leadership to monitor and co-ordinate activities in order to
strengthen the influence of the Government and marginalize regional causes of instability
(NZDF October 2010). Such support manifests itself at the provincial and local
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government in the provision of advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor, the
Afghan National Police and district sub-governors.
Physical, social and economic reconstruction has been a joint effort. An
American military contingent, which has access to funding from the US Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP), has also been assigned to the NZ PRT. Together,
they are responsible for timely project delivery, quality and cost while adhering to and
maintaining national guidelines. New Zealand‘s PRT has introduced a robust
Development Plan that includes Terms of Reference for Sector Working Group
representatives to ensure it meets both mission and local expectations. The combined
personnel are heavily involved in major road infrastructure, health and education
programs and have jointly facilitated the successful delivery of over 600 projects since
the deployment of the NZ PRT (Breen 2009; Fletcher 2009). The NZ PRT has assisted in
the rebuilding of Bamyan‘s physical infrastructure by identifying, preparing and
providing project management for NZAID projects within the region. These projects
have provided both employment and new amenities in the region because they are
contracted to Afghan companies that hire local workers, thus contributing to economic
reconstruction in the area (NZDF October 2010; Breen 2009).
In addition to its work on the re-building of Bamyan Province‘s physical
infrastructure, the NZ PRT has had a particular impact on some basic social
(re)development with regard to health, education and security (NZDF October 2009). As
of 2009, 83 percent of Afghans had access to basic healthcare, up from just eight percent
in 2002 (NZDF June 2009). In Bamyan province the provision of basic health care is a
combined effort between the NZ PRT and United States‘ military personnel. The US
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military initiated the organization of clinics so that people in remote areas of the warravaged province could access medical checks, and have their animals treated, dosed and
vaccinated at the same time. In addition to providing security for the clinics, the NZ PRT
team includes nurses and medics. Together with their US counterparts, as well as US
veterinarians, the NZ PRT personnel have run all-day multi-purpose clinics in several
remote villages that otherwise possess few or no medical facilities (Breen 2009). In this
regard, the NZ PRT‘s policy has been broad, seeing as many people and animals as
possible, and, where possible, providing them with medical treatment or advice and
referring some people to hospitals and dental facilities in Kabul or Bagram. Cattle,
donkeys, horses, sheep and have been vaccinated and dewormed, and dogs have been
given rabies vaccinations (NZDF July 2004). Malnourishment has been a major medical
problem in the Bamyan area. At the local hospital more than two thirds of the inpatient
pediatric admissions have been from (often very serious) malnourishment alone.
According to New Zealand Army nurse Captain Georgina Parata-Turvey:
Hopefully, when the area where we are based becomes stable, and life for
the local population returns to some sense of normality, with jobs
returning to the local economy and things as simple as being able to grow
crops and raise livestock happen without them being ‗requisitioned‘ by the
Taliban, the level of malnutrition will decrease. (NZDF July 2004, 5)
In 2009, Afghanistan had thirteen state universities, eight other state institutions
of higher education, and a dozen private universities in which 20 per cent of the students
were female (NZDF October 2009). At a provincial level, Bamyan Boys‘ School was
built with the assistance of the NZ PRT which helped with planning, the organization of
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contractors and the allocation of $500,000 worth of funds provided by NZAID (Breen
2009; NZDF 2006). According to New Zealand contingent commander, Group Captain
Kevin Short, the boys‘ school ―is avery visible and tangible example of progress towards
a positive future for the people of Bamyan‖ as education was key to the success of
Afghanistan as a country (NZDF December 2006).
Social redevelopment has also seen members of the NZ PRT engaged in
mentoring and teaching roles. In 2007, for example, the NZ PRT approved sponsorship
for a four-day Strategic Working Group with the intention of allowing Bamyan‘s Director
of Education and the Province‘s District Directors to meet together to learn about
strategic planning and to assist the Provincial Director in preparing a draft Provincial
Education Plan. The Provincial Director and his staff were also mentored in preparation
and delivery. At the completion of the Working Group meeting all objectives had been
achieved and attendees were united in their appreciation of the experience. Both the
organization of the meeting by the NZ PRT and the meeting itself constitute a further
strand and practical demonstration of reconstruction as local leaders are prepared to
assume responsibility for the development and outputs of their departments (Breen 2009;
Smith 2007).
One of the New Zealand Government‘s key areas of assistance in Afghanistan
relates to the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Martin 2006). In this regard, New Zealand
Police have worked very closely with the NZ PRT with day-to-day activities for police
personnel consisting of training, coaching or mentoring, facilitating the provision of
equipment and infrastructure, restructuring, pay-roll, rank reform and other specialist
project work. By 2007, much progress (albeit slow) and many notable achievements had
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been made in training and equipping the ANP which had resulted in a definite
improvement in the overall capability and competence of the ANP within Bamyan
Province. A fully functional Regional Training Centre had produced over 2,000 trainees
with 1,600 of these trainees returning to their police districts within the Province. The
new Bamyan Provincial Police Headquarters building was almost finished, good progress
was being made on pay-roll reform and the ANP restructure ‗the Tashkil‘ was underway
(Breen 2009; Edghill 2007). These successes stemmed from earlier work by the NZ PRT
including an NZAID-funded literacy program as illiteracy had been identified as one of
the biggest challenges facing Afghan police. In addition, capacity in the local force was
further supported by the instruction of local trainers by the NZ PRT (Breen 2009; Martin
2006).
Strengthening security and reconstruction of physical infrastructure saw the
provision of seven new police vehicles to the local police by NZAID, the building of five
new stations and the occurrence of several other smaller policing-related projects
throughout the province. The NZ PRT was charged with training an effective traffic
police force in Bamyan province. The extent of the required training was described by
Group Captain Howse who observed that, ―
[F]or many of the people we are training,
donkeys have been their main form of transport, so we have to start from scratch with
vehicles‖ (NZDF July 2004, 3). Using two of its own Toyota Hiluxs which it donated to
the Bamyan police to use as training vehicles, the NZ PRT trained the local police in
vehicle maintenance, driver evaluation and driver training, basic road rules, driving so as
to avoid damage to the vehicle by the roads and how to reverse a vehicle accurately. The
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police were instructed in vehicle checkpoint drills, skills which local police need to help
maintain security in the local area (Breen 2009; NZDF July 2004).
The intended impact of such hands-on activities in terms of physical, economic
and social reconstruction finds expression in the views of Air Force engineer Squadron
Leader Shane Meighan:
We‘re trying to build capacity, to get the local council to support itself,
and take care of its own planning and decision making. We‘re here to help
them develop the skills to be self-governing. Ultimately we should do
ourselves out of a job here I hope. That‘s our aim. (Martin 2006)
The role of the NZ PRT has also been described as one of giving effect to the
Afghan Government and ISAF‘s aim of establishing a secure environment. That such an
approach requires a long term view of security can be seen in the comments of the former
Deputy Chief of Plans at the Headquarters of ISAF, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Ramsden,
who stated:
Security improvements occur when the population sees growth in
governance capacity and tangible development effort. Winning the people
over is what will win this war; this means improving the lives of Afghans.
(Ramsden 2009, 2)
The Deputy Chief was also of the opinion that the challenge for Afghanistan was
to integrate the security line of operation (ISAF) with the governance responsibility (the
Afghan Government) and development (United Nations) lines to produce a combined
effect. He was of the opinion that for ISAF‘s part this meant genuine engagement,
showing ―
operational patience,‖ understanding the long game, and positioning for it. An
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integrated approach to security would require the Afghan Government to extend
appropriate governance and to deal with corruption. The integrated approach would
require the UN Mission to fulfill the basis for its establishment and to giving effect to its
mandate responsibilities (Breen 2009; Ramsden 2009).
As the previous paragraphs demonstrate, the necessities of reconstruction have
frequently drawn ISAF and the NZ PRT into activities that go well beyond their
originally intended missions of providing direct security, including the delivery of
essential services such as health care, education, or food. From the perspective of the
military forces, the destruction or defeat of the enemy should remain the key goal. Many
military forces may argue that they are not the appropriate actors to be performing nonsecurity related tasks on the basis that the performance of such tasks may lead to: a
dilution of the central role and motivation of the military which is warfighting; an
overstretching of increasing limited military resources; an overlapping of responsibilities
with civilian operators such as NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance resulting in
confusion and tensions between both sets of operators. NGOs may not welcome the
input or assistance of the military which the former may regard as inflexible and a threat
to the need to appear impartial amongst the local population. The overall outcome may
be unrealistic and result in unmet expectations on the part of the local populace (Ryan
2007; Wing 2000), which serves neither the military nor the non-military operators.
Increasingly, the reality is that complex peace support operations are deployed to many
areas where tenuous security conditions prevent humanitarian organizations, which may
be deliberately targeted by insurgents, from establishing a presence. In such situations,
the debate on specific domains becomes less relevant, and military involvement in non-
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military activities is necessary to provide a temporary gap and gain momentum for
reaching the primary military goal: the creation of stability (Rietjens 2009). The
achievement of this goal in turn facilitates the destruction of the enemy, the key and
traditional goal of the military forces.
However, the blurring of military and non-military roles and the increased cooperation with domestic governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as
international governmental actors raises the question of ―
ungoverned spaces‖ in
international law.
International Law and Stabilization and Development Mandates in Afghanistan:
Plenty of Policies but what about the Law?
Interventions by international organizations such as the UN and NATO, and their
on-going presence in Afghanistan, pose some challenges for jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. As part of any consideration of the, arguably open-ended, relationship between the
legal objectives for intervention and the manner by which those objectives are achieved,
it might be useful to consider some of the policy-based and legal complexities impacting
upon the current international presences in Afghanistan
Peacebuilding: A New Policy for an Old Problem?
In An Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that in order
for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations to be truly successful, such operations had
to include efforts both to identify and to support structures that would consolidate peace
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being (A/55/305-S/2000/809). Similarly, the
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World, stated that, ―[
R]esources spent on implementation of peace agreements and
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peacebuilding are one of the best investments that can be made for conflict prevention States that have experienced civil war face a high risk of recurrence‖ (A/59/565, para.
221). Furthermore, the High Level Panel was of the view that:
Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build
effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society,
can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law.
Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial
and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and
reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector service
delivery can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding. This should be
reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial
institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long- term policy
and funding. (A/59/565, para. 229)
Similarly, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the
Brahimi Report) identified the way in which the UN had conceived of, funded and
implemented peace-building strategies and activities as being a fundamental deficiency.
It not only laid out a clear peace-building strategy in an effort to bridge the chasm
between the development and the conflict management sides of the UN (Griffin 2003), it
also called for clear, credible and achievable mandates for peacekeeping (A/55/305 S/2000/809; Breau 2006). Similarly, the link between poverty reduction, economic
growth and conflict prevention was identified in the UN‘s Millennium Report
(A/54/2000) and the theme was further expanded upon by the International Commission
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In its report, the Responsibility to Protect,
the ICISS stated:
Too often the responsibility to rebuild had been insufficiently recognized
and the exit of the intervention poorly managed with the underlying
problems causing the conflict left unresolved. In addition to the more
obvious aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the
armed, other aspects of post-conflict activity were the necessity for justice,
reconciliation and economic growth. (ICISS 2001, para.5.2)
According to the ICISS:
True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained daily efforts at
repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting and harvesting,
and cooperating in other productive activities. External support for
reconciliation efforts must be conscious of the need to encourage this
cooperation, and dynamically linked to joint development efforts between
former adversaries. (ICISS 2001, para. 5.4)
Collectively, these reports constitute a rethinking of international policy.
International interventions must now deal with harsh realities such as violent attacks,
badly broken infrastructure, mounting frustration with occupiers over insecurity, lack of
basic services, and unemployment (Rudderham (2007/08). Neglecting health, education
and other needs of the civilian population may not only entrench dependency on external
aid and render the population less capable of recovering from war but it may also
increase the likelihood of a resumption of conflict. Consequently, the view has developed
that humanitarian and conflict management operations must be linked, so that longer-
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term, locally-driven, capacity-building development interventions must take root
alongside the expensive, large-scale, short-term, externally driven humanitarian
interventions responses to that typify the initial response to crises (Breen 2009; Griffin
2003). Although such policy initiatives are to be welcomed, there remains the question
of how such policies impact on the law which underpins the deployment of peace support
operations, and within which the distinction between military and non-military roles are
blurred.
Jus ad bellum
As Security Council resolutions indicate, ISAF‘s presence is in response to the
on-going threat to international peace and security posed by the situation in Afghanistan.
Responding to that threat is the legal basis for the collective security response embodied,
in this case, in the peace enforcement operation. UNAMA‘s role is one of assisting
Afghanistan to transition from conflict to sustainable peace. It is not a Chapter VII action.
Rather, it falls under the broader principles surrounding the maintenance of international
peace and security as enshrined in the Charter, particularly in Chapter VI. The Council‘s
endorsement of the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact and subsequent
Communiqués and its more recent recognition of the synergies between the mandates of
ISAF and UNAMA, in renewing ISAF‘s mandate under Chapter VII, are evidence of jus
ad bellum, or a collective security response, based not only on military responses to a
threat to the peace. Such endorsement is also evidence of a collective security response
which appears to be incorporating non-military responses to deal with that threat (Stahn
2006). Post-conflict reconstruction is not a novel concept. The relationship between
peace and security and economic and social reconstruction and development can be
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traced back to the early years of the UN and the immediate aftermath of WWII.
However, much of the focus on reconstruction and development takes place in a postconflict context (A/59/565).
In many ways, the intervention in Afghanistan is following the UN blueprint for
peace support identified from Agenda to Peace onwards. However, the pacification and
stabilization efforts are running concurrently with economic and social development,
indeed the latter are part of the stabilization process. The Security Council mandates
underpinning ISAF suggest an evolution in collective security where intervention remains
to be justified by a long-term, effective plan to deal to the threat that triggered the initial
armed intervention. The evolution of collective security practice poses interesting
questions regarding the nature and extent of the obligations placed upon the UN, troop
contributing nations and the international community to counter the threat to peace and
security that formed, and continues to form, the legal basis for peace enforcement in
Afghanistan.
Jus in bello
The evolution of collective security also raises difficulties for the operation of
such policies by States and peacekeepers within the current confines of IHL. Currently
there exists an on-going armed conflict between Afghan Government forces (supported
by ISAF), on the one hand, and insurgent Taliban forces (a non-state actor), on the other.
Despite the presence of ISAF, this conflict is classified as a non-international armed
conflict (Engdahl 2008). Consequently, ISAF (and the Afghan forces) is required to
comply with, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions relating to
certain minimum standards of humane treatment that are applicable instances of armed
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conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties. Additional Protocol II may also be applicable but only where a troop
contributing nation has ratified that treaty. This requirement presents one of a number of
difficulties in trying to create a cohesive body of international law (Kouvo 2009) given
that the United States, for example, has not ratified the Protocol but New Zealand has.
According to the Secretary-General, as the number of PRTs increase, as well as the
number of countries involved in them, issues of consistency and coordination with the
Government and the international community are increasingly relevant. Special attention
should be paid to ensuring that a unified vision and common policy are implemented
countrywide (A/58/742-S/2004/230).
Customary international law seeks to plug some of the gaps in IHL that regulate
non-international conflicts. Both Common Article 3 and a number of provisions of APII
are now regarded as to be part of customary international law. The ICJ has affirmed that
the provisions of common Article 3 reflect customary international law and represent a
minimum standard from which the parties to any type of armed conflict must not depart
(Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986). With regards to
APII, among the acts governed by customary international law are the: prohibition of
attacks on civilians; obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel,
medical units and transports; obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of persons
who are not taking a direct part, or who have ceased to take a direct part, in hostilities;
obligation to search for and respect and protect the wounded and sick (and shipwrecked);
obligation to protect persons deprived of their liberty; prohibition of the forced movement
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of civilians; and specific protection for women and children (Henckaerts and DoswaldBeck 2005).
The impact of IHL upon peace enforcement operations is somewhat awkward,
however. The UN is not party to any IHL treaties, although there appears to be little
doubt but that the provisions of humanitarian law that have customary status do apply to
UN forces (Murphy 2003). The UN is not capable of following IHL, which is Statecentric, in its entirety. Chapter VII authorizes use of force which would suggest that the
rules of IHL should govern the conduct of peace enforcement operations but such
operations do not easily sit within the framework of internal conflict law and do not sit at
all within the ‗inter-state‘ framework of international law (Engdahl 2008). Thus, the
positive obligations regarding the protection of civilians, for example, would appear to
apply to combatants but not peacekeepers or enforcers (Murphy 2003).
According to Article 1.1 of the Secretary-General‘s Bulletin on the Observance by
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, the fundamental principles
and rules of IHL set out in the Bulletin are applicable to UN forces when in situations of
armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the
duration of their engagement (Engdahl 2008). The Bulletin contains detailed guidance on
Geneva law issues relative to the treatment and protection of civilians, detainees, and
wounded and sick combatants. It also contains detailed guidance on Hague law issues
relative to the means and methods of combat. The approach of the Secretary-General was
based on the premise that peace enforcement operations could not be categorized as
traditional armed conflict. The legal status of this Bulletin is debatable but it does provide
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a foundation for legal advisors, commanders and civil authorities tasked to implement
peace enforcement operations (Hoffman 2000).
Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel states that the:
Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged
as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of
international armed conflict applies.
This view would suggest that the mere presence of United Nations peacekeeping
soldiers in an area of conﬂict or a theatre of war, while performing a humanitarian or
diplomatic mission, does not necessarily mean that humanitarian law binds these troops
(Murphy 2003) and they are entitled to the status of civilians under IHL and the legal
rights and obligations that ensue. This view is consonant with a prima facie reading of
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and, arguably, clarifies the legal
status of UNAMA personnel. For the purposes of the Safety Convention, the status
change as between combatant and civilian reflects the same conditions for civilians in
general (Engdahl 2008). The Secretary-General also noted that the express reference to
the laws regulating international conflict, ―
gives rise to the suggestion that enforcement
actions carried out in situations of internal armed conflict (UNOSOM II type of
operations) are included within the scope of the Convention and subject to its protective
regime‖ (A/55/637 2000, 9 (fn. 3)). He concluded, however, that it was not the nature or
character of the conflict that should determine whether the Convention or IHL applied
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but whether, ―
in any type of conflict, members of United Nations peacekeeping
operations are actively engaged therein as combatants, or are otherwise entitled to the
protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict‖ (A/55/637
2000, 9 (fn. 3)).
The preceding paragraphs are illustrative some of current legal complexities and
potential loopholes in the law. Restricting the rules binding parties to Common Article 3
or to APII clearly overlooks the international dimension to the conflict (Murphy 2003).
Moreover, ISAF troops may be combatants engaged in conﬂict and, thus, subject to
broader IHL rules when they are acting as members of national armed forces. The same
troops, and/or other members of armed forces in the same armed conﬂict, when they are
not engaged in combat but are acting as peacekeepers are exempted from IHL obligations
to respect the rights of protected persons (Murphy 2003). The switch between noncombatant and combatant status may serve to answer some of the questions as to rights
and obligations of the combatant. It may address the issue of the rights of the noncombatant but it does not clearly address obligations of peace support personnel engaged
in non-combatant roles, a range of activities neatly encapsulated in the role of the PRTs.
It may be that the work of the PRTs are simply over and above the minimum standards
provided for by Common Article 3 and APII, if such activities are carried out during the
course of conflict.
The question arises then as to which body of law are peace support personnel
most appropriately subject to, in the international and domestic arenas, in the course of
non-combat activities as some of the work of the NZ PRT would appear to be. Arguably,
such personnel may become subject to human rights law, in this case, the domestic laws
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of New Zealand, with New Zealand, in turn, being governed by its obligations in the
international sphere. Currently, however, the application of human rights law to peace
support personnel, especially with regard to activities arising from reconstruction and
development, is a less than satisfactory approach. Reconstruction and development
activities are closely correlated to economic and social rights such as the rights to an
adequate standard of living, health and education (Breen 2009). However, accountability
for a failure to achieve such rights is not easily resolved as some States, including New
Zealand, strongly resist attempts to provide a judicial or quasi-judicial remedy for the
breach of such rights (Breen 2008). Moreover, the issue of accountability for the breach
of economic and social rights is rife with more uncertainty as the issues of extraterritorial
application of human rights treaties and responsibility (state or international) organization
for breaches thereof remain to be traversed.
The nature of conflict has changed. More significantly, the collective security
response embodied in the Charter sets out the pattern of potential responses. The
evolution of peace support operations, including the increased emphasis on economic and
social development components, suggests an evolution in both jus ad bellum, as well as
jus in bello. However, only a small component of IHL, being the laws of occupation, was
drafted with this type of activity in mind. There remains rather a large gap in
international treaty law as regards the issue of whether the military when participating in
peace support operations are under any positive obligations such as a duty to build
hospitals as opposed to the current IHL obligation to refrain from bombing hospitals.
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Conclusion
Peace support operations are a necessary but ad hoc response to breaches of
international peace and security, or threats thereof. Peace support operations operate
under the umbrella of IHL which incorporates, in particular, Articles 1 and 2 and
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, as well as the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols.
Peace support operations are a manifestation of modern collective security
measures as set out in the UN Charter and are indicative of an evolved jus ad bellum.
ISAF and UNAMA, with their interrelated synergies and their reliance upon the Bonn
Agreement, the Afghan Compact and later Communiqués are the legal and practical
response to the requirements of the afore-mentioned Charter provisions. The work of the
PRTs demonstrates the blurring of the military and non-military roles designed to meet
the objectives of ISAF and UNAMA. The situation in Afghanistan is indicative of a
peace enforcement operation based on an initial military response followed by an
immediate military and civilian component, or a military and civilian component running
concurrently. Jus ad bellum seems to be incorporating a reconstruction and development
response, either way. The broader functions of the military in peace support raises
questions for jus in bello as States and their armed forces engage in stabilization and
state-building initiatives, initiatives that are not easily incorporated into IHL.
With regards to Afghanistan, a clear link between peace and security and
stabilization and development exists and the link underpins the peace support operation.
However, the extent of the legal obligations incurred is not clear as the mandates are
vague. On a more positive note, it would appear that the international community in
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Afghanistan is seeking to follow quite closely the peace-building strategy outlined by the
UN over the past two decades. However, the manner in which such a strategy fits into
the framework of international law governing those who have undertaken the
responsibility to effect the strategy remains unclear. The legal consequences of these
developments for IHL is unclear given that the latter was drafted largely to deal with
inter-state conflict and, to a more limited extent, internal conflict. The boundary between
these categories is no longer clear in the context of peace support missions, especially
those authorized under Chapter VII. As the work of the NZ PRT suggests, the nature of
military roles is evolving as it increasingly engages economic and social reconstruction
and development.
This state of affairs raises the question of whether the international community
needs (yet another) treaty, a further Additional Protocol to set some parameters for peace
support operations. Such a treaty might assist in drawing together a framework against
which issues such as the extent of a State‘s obligations, the manner in which such
objectives are to be met and how the international community, and troop contributing
nations such as New Zealand knows that it has met its objectives.
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